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Abstract. Sensors are embedded in security-critical applications from
medical devices to nuclear power plants, but their outputs can be spoofed
through electromagnetic and other types of signals transmitted by at-
tackers at a distance. To address the lack of a unifying framework for
evaluating the effects of such transmissions, we introduce a system and
threat model for signal injection attacks. We further define the concepts
of existential, selective, and universal security, which address attacker
goals from mere disruptions of the sensor readings to precise waveform
injections. Moreover, we introduce an algorithm which allows circuit de-
signers to concretely calculate the security level of real systems. Finally,
we apply our definitions and algorithm in practice using measurements of
injections against a smartphone microphone, and analyze the demodula-
tion characteristics of commercial Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs).
Overall, our work highlights the importance of evaluating the suscepti-
bility of systems against signal injection attacks, and introduces both the
terminology and the methodology to do so.1
Keywords: Signal Injection Attacks · Security Metrics · Analog-to-
Digital Converters · Electromagnetic Interference · Non-linearities
1 Introduction
In our daily routine we interact with dozens of sensors: from motion detection
in home security systems and tire pressure monitors in cars, to accelerometers
in smartphones and heart rate monitors in smartwatches. The integrity of these
sensor outputs is crucial, as many security-critical decisions are taken in response
to the sensor values. However, specially-crafted adversarial signals can be used
to remotely induce waveforms into the outputs of sensors, thereby attacking
pacemakers [10], temperature sensors [5], smartphone microphones [9], and car-
braking mechanisms [20]. These attacks cause a system to report values which do
not match the true sensor measurements, and trick it into performing dangerous
actions such as raising false alarms, or even delivering defibrillation shocks.
The root cause of these vulnerabilities lies in the unintentional side-effects of
the physical components of a system. For example, the wires connecting sensors
1 This article is the extended technical report version of the paper presented at
ESORICS 2019. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-29959-0 25.
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to microcontrollers behave like low-power, low-gain antennas, and can thus pick
up high-frequency electromagnetic radiations. Although these radiations are con-
sidered “noise” from an electrical point of view, hardware imperfections in the
subsequent parts of the circuit can transform attacker injections into meaningful
waveforms. Specifically, these radiations are digitized along with the true sensor
outputs, which represent a physical property as an analog electrical quantity.
This digitization process is conducted by Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs),
which, when used outside of their intended range, can cause high-frequency sig-
nals to be interpreted as meaningful low-frequency signals.
Despite the potential that signal injection attacks have to break security guar-
antees, there is no unifying framework for evaluating the effect of such adversarial
transmissions. Our work fills this gap through the following contributions:
1. We propose a system model which abstracts away from engineering concerns
associated with remote transmissions, such as antenna design (Section 2).
2. We define security against adversarial signal injection attacks. Our defini-
tions address effects ranging from mere disruptions of the sensor readings,
to precise waveform injections of attacker-chosen values (Section 3).
3. We introduce an algorithm to calculate the security level of a system under
our definitions and demonstrate it in practice by injecting “OK Google”
commands into a smartphone (Section 4).
4. We investigate how vulnerable commercial ADCs are to malicious signal
injection attacks by testing their demodulation properties (Section 5).
5. We discuss how our model can be used to inform circuit design choices,
and how to interpret defense mechanisms and other types of signal injection
attacks in its context (Section 6).
Overall, our work highlights the importance of testing systems against signal
injection attacks, and proposes a methodology to test the security of real devices.
2 System and Adversary Model
Remote signal injection attacks pose new challenges from a threat-modeling
perspective, since the electrical properties of systems suggest that adversaries
cannot arbitrarily and precisely change any sensor reading. To create a threat
model and define security in its context, we need to first abstract away from spe-
cific circuit designs and engineering concerns related to remote transmissions. To
do so, we separate the behavior of a system into two different transfer functions.
The first function describes circuit-specific behavior, including how adversarial
signals enter the circuit (e.g., through PCB wires acting as antennas), while the
second one is ADC-specific, and dictates how the signals which have made it into
the circuit are digitized. We describe this model in greater detail in Section 2.1,
taking a necessary detour into electrical engineering to show why our proposal
makes for a good system model. We then explain some sources of measurement
errors even in the absence of an adversary in Section 2.2 and finish by detailing
the capabilities and limitations of the adversary in Section 2.3. Both sub-sections
are crucial in motivating the security definitions of Section 3.
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Fig. 1: System model: an adversarial signal v(t) enters the circuit and is trans-
formed via the transfer function HC . It is digitized along with the sensor signal
s(t) and the noise n(t) through an ADC-specific transfer function HA. In suc-
cessful attacks, the digitized signal will contain the demodulated version w(t) of
the attacker signal v(t) = M(w(t)), where M is the modulation function (e.g.,
amplitude modulation over a high-frequency carrier).
2.1 Circuit Model
Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs) are central in the digitization process of
converting signals from the analog to the digital realm, and our circuit block di-
agram (Figure 1) reflects that. In the absence of an adversary, the ADC digitizes
the sensor signal s(t) as well as the environmental noise n(t), and transfers the
digital bits to a microcontroller. We model the ADC in two parts: an “ideal”
ADC which simply digitizes the signal, and a transfer function HA. This transfer
function describes the internal behavior of the ADC, which includes effects such
as filtering and amplification. The digitized version of the signal s˜f (t) depends
both on this transfer function, and the sampling frequency f of the ADC. An
adversarial signal can enter the system (e.g., through the wires connecting the
sensor to the ADC) and add to the sensor signal and the noise. This process can
be described by a second, circuit-specific transfer function HC , which transforms
the adversarial signal v(t) into v˜(t). Note that components such as external filters
and amplifiers in the signal path between the point of injection and the ADC
can be included in either HA or HC . We include them in HA when they also
affect the sensor signal s(t), but in HC when they are specific to the coupling
effect. HC and HA are discussed in detail below.
Circuit Transfer Function HC . To capture the response of the circuit to
external signal injections, we introduce a transfer function HC . This transfer
function explains why the adversarial waveforms must be modulated, and why
it is helpful to try and reduce the number of remote experiments to perform.
For electromagnetic interference (EMI) attacks, the wires connecting the sensor
to the ADC pick up signals by acting as (unintentional) low-power and low-gain
antennas, which are resonant at specific frequencies related to the inverse of the
wire length [12]. Non-resonant frequencies are attenuated more, so for a success-
ful attack the adversary must transmit signals at frequencies with relatively low
attenuation. For short wires, these frequencies are in the GHz range [12], so the
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Fig. 2: The sample-and-hold mechanism of an ADC is an RC low-pass filter. Elec-
trostatic Discharge (ESD) protection diodes can also introduce non-linearities.
low-frequency waveform w(t) that the adversary wants to inject into the output
of the ADC s˜f (t) may need to be modulated over a high-frequency carrier using a
function M . We denote this modulated version of the signal by v(t) = M(w(t)).
HC is also affected by passive and active components on the path to the
ADC, and can also be influenced by inductive and capacitive coupling for small
transmission distances, as it closely depends on the circuit components and their
placement. Specifically, it is possible for 2 circuits with “the same components,
circuit topology and placement area” to have different EMI behavior depending
on the component placement on the board [13]. Despite the fact that it is hard to
mathematically model and predict the behavior of circuits in response to different
signal transmissions, HC can still be determined empirically using frequency
sweeps. It presents a useful abstraction, allowing us to separate the behavior of
the ADC (which need only be determined once, for instance by the manufacturer)
from circuit layout and transmission details.
Note, finally, that HC can also account for distance factors between the
adversary and the circuit under test: due to the Friis transmission formula [4],
as distance doubles, EMI transmission power needs to quadruple. This effect
can be captured by increasing the attenuation of HC by 6 dB, while defense
mechanisms such as shielding can be addressed similarly. This approach allows
us to side-step engineering issues of remote transmissions and reduce the number
of parameters used in the security definitions we propose in Section 3.
ADC Transfer Function HA. Every system with sensors contains one or more
ADCs, which may even be integrated into the sensor chip itself. ADCs are not
perfect, but contain components which may cause a mismatch between the “true”
value at the ADC input and the digitized output. In this section, we describe
how these components affect the digitization process.
Although there are many types of ADCs, every ADC contains three ba-
sic components: a “sample- or track-and-hold circuit where the sampling takes
place, the digital-to-analog converter and a level-comparison mechanism” [15].
The sample-and-hold component acts as a low-pass filter, and makes it harder
for an adversary to inject signals modulated at high frequencies. However, the
level-comparison mechanism is essentially an amplifier with non-linearities which
induces DC offsets, and allows low-frequency intermodulation products to pass
through. These ADC-specific transformations, modeled through HA, uninten-
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tionally demodulate high-frequency signals which are not attenuated by HC .
They are explored in more detail in Section 5 and Appendix A.
Sample-And-Hold Filter Characteristics. A sample-and-hold (S/H) mech-
anism is an RC circuit connected to the analog input, with the resistor and the
capacitor connected in series (Figure 2). The transfer function of the voltage
across the capacitor is HS/H(jω) =
1
1+jωRC , and the magnitude of the gain
is GS/H =
1√
1+(ωRC)2
. As the angular frequency ω = 2pif increases, the gain
is reduced: the S/H mechanism acts as a low-pass filter. The −3 dB cutoff fre-
quency is thus fcut =
1
2piRC , which is often higher than the ADC sampling rate
(Section 5). Hence, “aliasing” occurs when signals beyond the Nyquist frequency
are digitized by the ADC: high-frequency signals become indistinguishable from
low-frequency signals which the ADC can sample accurately.
Amplifier Non-Linearities. Every ADC contains amplifiers: a comparator,
and possibly buffer and differential amplifiers. Many circuits also contain addi-
tional external amplifiers to make weak signals measurable. All these amplifiers
have harmonic and intermodulation non-linear distortions [17], which an adver-
sary can exploit. Harmonics are produced when an amplifier transforms an input
vin to an output vout =
∑∞
n=1 anv
n
in. In particular, if vin = vˆ · sin(ωt), then:
vout =
(
a2vˆ
2
2
+
3a4vˆ
4
8
+ · · ·
)
+(a1vˆ + · · ·) sin(ωt)−
(
a2vˆ
2
2
+ · · ·
)
cos(2ωt)+ · · ·
This equation shows that “the frequency spectrum of the output contains a
spectral component at the original (fundamental) frequency, [and] at multiples
of the fundamental frequency (harmonic frequencies)” [17]. Moreover, the output
includes a DC component, which depends only on the even-order non-linearities
of the system. Besides harmonics, intermodulation products arise when the input
signal is a sum of two sinusoids (for instance when the injected signal sums with
the sensor signal): vin = vˆ1 · sin(ω1t) + vˆ2 · sin(ω2t). In that case, the output
signal contains frequencies of the form nω1 ±mω2 for integers n,m 6= 0. These
non-linearities demodulate attacker waveforms, even when they are modulated
on high-frequency carriers.
Diode Rectification. Figure 2 shows that the input to an ADC can contain
reverse-biased diodes to ground and Vcc to protect the input from Electrostatic
Discharge (ESD). When the input to the ADC is negative, or when it exceeds
Vcc, the diodes clamp it, causing non-linear behavior. When the sensor signal
s(t) is positive, this behavior is also asymmetric, causing a DC shift [17], which
compounds with the amplifier non-linearities.
Conclusion. All ADCs contain the same basic building blocks, modeled through
HA. Although the sample-and-hold mechanism should attenuate high-frequency
signals beyond the maximum sampling rate of the ADC, non-linearities due to
ESD diodes and amplifiers in the ADC cause DC offsets and the demodula-
tion of signals through harmonics and intermodulation products. Section 5 and
Appendix A exemplify these effects through experiments on different ADCs.
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Fig. 3: Noise probability distribution p(x). The shaded area represents the prob-
ability  = N(x) = Pr[|n(t)|≤ x].
2.2 Sampling Errors in the Absence of an Adversary
The digitization process through ADCs entails errors due to quantization and
environmental noise. Quantization errors exist due to the inherent loss of accu-
racy in the sampling process. An ADC can only represent values within a range,
say between Vmin and Vmax volts, with a finite binary representation of N bits,
called the resolution of the ADC. In other words, every value between Vmin and
Vmax is mapped to one of the 2
N values that can be represented using N bits.
As a result, there is a quantization error between the true sensor analog value s
and the digitized value s˜. The maximum value of this error is
Q =
Vmax − Vmin
2N+1
≥ |s− s˜| (1)
The second source of error comes from environmental noise, which may affect
measurements. We assume that this noise, denoted by n(t), is independent of
the signal being measured, and that it comes from a zero-mean distribution, i.e.,
that the noise is white. The security definitions we introduce in Section 3 require
an estimate of the level of noise in the system, so we introduce some relevant
notation here. We assume that n(t) follows a probability distribution function
(PDF) p(x), and define N(x) as the probability that the noise is between −x
and x, as shown in Figure 3, i.e.,
N(x) = Pr [|n(t)|≤ x] =
∫ x
−x
p(u)du
Note that typically the noise is assumed to come from a normal distribution,
but this assumption is not necessary in our models and definitions.
We are also interested in the inverse of this function, where given a probability
0 ≤  < 1, we want to find x ≥ 0 such that N(x) = . For this x, the probability
that the noise magnitude falls within [−x, x] is , as also shown in Figure 3.
Because for some distributions there might be multiple x for which N(x) = ,
we use the smallest such value:
N−1() = inf{x ≥ 0 : N(x) = } (2)
Since N(x) is an increasing function, so is N−1().
To account for repeated measurements, we introduce a short-hand for sam-
pling errors, which we denote by Es(t). The sampling errors depend on the sensor
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input into the ADC s(t), the sampling rate f , the discrete output of the ADC
s˜f (t) as well as the conversion delay τ , representing the time the ADC takes for
complete a conversion:
Es(t) =
{
|s˜f (t+ τ)− s(t)| if a conversion starts at t
0 otherwise
(3)
2.3 Adversary Model
Our threat model and definitions can capture a range of attacker goals, from
attackers who merely want to disrupt sensor outputs, to those who wish to
inject precise waveforms into a system. We define these notions precisely in
Section 3, but here we describe the attacker capabilities based on our model of
Figure 1. Specifically, in our model, the adversary can only alter the transmitted
adversarial signal v(t). He/she cannot directly influence the sensor signal s(t), the
(residual) noise n(t), or the transfer functions HA and HC . The adversary knows
HA, HC , and the distribution of the noise n(t), although the true sensor signal
s(t) might be hidden from the adversary (see Section 3.2). The only constraint
placed on the adversarial signal is that the attacker is only allowed to transmit
signals v(t) whose peak voltage level is bounded by some constant V AdvPK , i.e.,
|v(t)|≤ V AdvPK for all t. We call this adversary a V AdvPK -bound adversary, and all
security definitions are against such bounded adversaries.
We choose to restrict voltage rather than restricting power or distance, as
it makes for a more powerful adversarial model. Our model gives the adversary
access to any physical equipment necessary (such as powerful amplifiers and
highly-directional antennas), while reducing the number of parameters needed
for our security definitions of Section 3. Distance and power effects can be com-
pensated directly through altering V AdvPK , or indirectly by integrating them into
HC , as discussed in Section 2.1.
3 Security Definitions
Using the model of Figure 1, we can define security in the presence of signal
injection attacks. The V AdvPK -bound adversary is allowed to transmit any wave-
form v(t), provided that |v(t)|≤ V AdvPK for all t: the adversary is only constrained
by the voltage budget. Whether or not the adversary succeeds in injecting the
target waveform w(t) into the output of the system depends on the transfer
functions HC and HA. For a given system described by HA and HC , there are
three outcomes against an adversary whose only restriction is voltage:
1. The adversary can disturb the sensor readings, but cannot precisely control
the measurement outputs, an attack we call existential injection. The lack
of existential injections can be considered universal security.
2. The adversary can inject a target waveform w(t) into the ADC outputs with
high fidelity, performing a selective injection. If the adversary is unable to
succeed, the system is selectively secure against w(t).
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Table 1: Correspondence between security properties of a sensor system, adver-
sarial injection attacks, and the resulting ADC waveform errors (signals).
Security Injection ADC Error Es(t)
Universal Existential Bounded away from 0
Selective Selective Target waveform w(t)
Existential Universal Non-trivial waveforms w(t)
3. The adversary can universally inject any waveform w(t). If there is any non-
trivial waveform for which he/she fails, the system is existentially secure.
This section sets out to precisely define the above security notions by account-
ing for noise and quantization error (Equation (1)). Our definitions capture the
intuition that systems are secure when there are no adversarial transmissions,
and are “monotonic” in voltage, i.e., systems are more vulnerable against ad-
versaries with access to higher-powered transmitters. Our definitions are also
monotonic in noise: in other words, in environments with low noise, even a small
disturbance of the output is sufficient to break the security of a system. Sec-
tion 3.1 evaluates whether an adversary can disturb the ADC output away from
its correct value sufficiently. Section 3.2 then formalizes the notion of selective
security against target waveforms w(t). Finally, Section 3.3 introduces universal
injections by defining what a non-trivial waveform is. The three types of signal
injection attacks, the corresponding security properties, and the ensuing ADC
errors (injected waveforms) are summarized in Table 1.2
3.1 Existential Injection, Universal Security
The most primitive type of signal injection attack is a simple disruption of the
sensor readings. There are two axes in which this notion can be evaluated: ad-
versarial voltage and probability of success (success is probabilistic, as noise is
a random variable). For a fixed probability of success, we want to determine
the smallest voltage level for which an attack is successful. For a fixed voltage
level, we want to find the probability of a successful attack. Alternatively, if we
fix both the voltage and the probability of success, we want to determine if a
system is secure against disruptive signal injection attacks.
The definition for universal security is a formalization of the above intuition,
calling a system secure when, even in the presence of injections (bounded by
adversarial voltage), the true analog sensor value and the ADC digital output do
not deviate by more than the quantization error and the noise, with sufficiently
high probability. Mathematically:
2 The terminology chosen was inspired by attacks against signature schemes, where
how broken a system is depends on what types of messages an attacker can forge [8].
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Definition 1 (Universal Security, Existential Injection). For 0 ≤  < 1,
and V AdvPK ≥ 0, we call a system universally (, V AdvPK )-secure if
Pr
[
Es(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
+ 1
2
)]
≤ + 1
2
(4)
for every adversarial waveform v(t), with |v(t)|≤ V AdvPK for all t. Q is the quan-
tization error of the system, N−1 is the noise distribution inverse defined in
Equation (2), and Es is the sampling error as defined by Equation (3). The
probability is taken over the duration of the attack, i.e., at each sampling point
within the interval tstart ≤ t ≤ tend. We call a successful attack an existential
injection, and simply call a system universally -secure, when V AdvPK is implied.
We first show that in the absence of injections, the system is universally -
secure for all 0 ≤  < 1. Indeed, let x = N−1 ( +12 ) , so that Pr [|n(t)|≤ x] = +12 .
Then, in the absence of injections,
Pr
[
Es(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
+ 1
2
)]
= Pr [|n(t)|≥ x] =
= 1− + 1
2
=
1− 
2
≤ + 1
2
which holds for all 0 ≤  < 1, as desired. This proof is precisely the reason for
requiring a noise level and probability of at least 50% in the definition: the proof
no longer works if (1 + )/2 is replaced by just . In other words, mere noise
would be classified as an attack by the modified definition.
Voltage. We now show that a higher adversarial voltage budget can only make
a system more vulnerable. Indeed, if a system is universally (, V1)-secure, then
it is universally (, V2)-secure for V2 ≤ V1. For this, it suffices to prove the
contrapositive, i.e., that if a system is not universally (, V2)-secure, then it is not
universally (, V1)-secure. For the proof, let v(t) be an adversarial waveform with
|v(t)|≤ V2 such that Equation (4) does not hold, which exists by the assumption
that the system is not universally (, V2)-secure. Then, by the transitive property,
|v(t)|≤ V1, making v(t) a valid counterexample for universal (, V1) security.
Probability. The third property we show is probability monotonicity, allowing
us to define a “critical threshold” for , above which a system is universally secure
(for a fixed V AdvPK ), and below which a system is not universally secure. Indeed,
for fixed V AdvPK , if a system is universally (, V
Adv
PK )-secure, then it is universally
(+ δ, V AdvPK )-secure for 0 ≤ δ < 1− , as
Pr
[
Es(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
+ δ + 1
2
)]
≤
Pr
[
Es(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
+ 1
2
)]
≤ + 1
2
≤ + δ + 1
2
because N−1 is increasing. The contrapositive is, of course, also true: if a system
is not universally secure for a given , it is also not universally secure for  − δ
with 0 ≤ δ ≤ .
10 Ilias Giechaskiel, Youqian Zhang, and Kasper B. Rasmussen
Thresholds. For a given security level , then, we can talk about the maximum
(if any) V AdvPK such that a system is universally (, V
Adv
PK )-secure, or conversely the
minimum (if any) V AdvPK such that a system is not universally (, V
Adv
PK )-secure.
This is the critical universal voltage level Vc for the given . Moreover, for
any V AdvPK , there is a unique critical universal security threshold c such
that the system is universally (, V AdvPK )-secure for c <  < 1 and not universally
(, V AdvPK )-secure for 0 ≤  < c. By convention we take c = 0 if the system is
secure for all , and c = 1 if there is no  for which the system is secure. This
critical threshold indicates the security level of a system: the lower c is, the
better a system is protected against signal injection attacks.
3.2 Selective Injection and Security
The second definition captures the notion of security against specific target wave-
forms w(t): we wish to find the probability that a V AdvPK -bounded adversary can
make w(t) appear in the output of the ADC. Conversely, to define security in
this context, we must make sure that the digitized signal s˜f (t) differs from the
waveform s(t) + w(t) with high probability, even if plenty of noise is allowed.
There are two crucial points to notice about the waveform w(t). First, w(t) is not
the raw signal v(t) the adversary is transmitting, as this signal undergoes two
transformations via HC and HA. Instead, w(t) is the signal that the adversary
wants the ADC to think that it is seeing, and is usually a demodulated version
of v(t) (see Figure 1). Second, w(t) does not necessarily cancel out or overpower
s(t), because that would require predictive modeling of the sensor signal s(t).
However, if the adversary can predict s(t) (e.g., by monitoring the output of
the ADC, or by using identical sensors), we can then ask about security against
the waveform w′(t) = w(t) − s(t) instead. Given this intuition, we can define
selective security as follows:
Definition 2 (Selective Security, Selective Injection). For 0 ≤  < 1, and
V AdvPK ≥ 0, a system is called selectively (, w(t), V AdvPK )-secure if
Pr
[
Es+w(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
(1− ) + 1
2
)]
>
2− 
2
(5)
for every adversarial waveform v(t), with |v(t)|≤ V AdvPK for all t, where the prob-
ability is taken over the duration of the attack. Q is the quantization error of
the system, N−1 is the noise distribution inverse defined in Equation (2), and
Es+w(t) = |s˜f (t+ τ)− s(t)− w(t)| during sampling periods, and 0 otherwise.
We call a successful attack a selective injection, and simply call a system
selectively -secure, when V AdvPK and w(t) are clear from context.
This definition is monotonic in voltage and the probability of success, allowing
us to talk about “the” probability of success for a given waveform:
Voltage. A similar argument shows that increasing V AdvPK can only make a secure
system insecure, but not vice versa, i.e., that if a system is selectively (, w(t), V1)-
secure, then it is selectively (, w(t), V2)-secure for V2 ≤ V1. We can thus define
the critical selective voltage level V wc for a given  and w(t).
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Probability. If a system is selectively -secure (against a target waveform and
voltage budget), then it is selectively (+ δ)-secure for 0 ≤ δ < 1− , because
P = Pr
[
Es+w(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
1− (+ δ) + 1
2
)]
≥ Pr
[
Es+w(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
1− + 1
2
)]
>
2− 
2
≥ 2− (+ δ)
2
If the system is not selectively -secure, then it is not selectively (− δ)-secure.
Given the above, for a given waveform w(t) and fixed V AdvPK , we can define
a waveform-specific critical selective security threshold wc such that the
system is vulnerable for all w with 0 ≤ w < wc and secure for all w with
wc < 
w < 1. By convention we take wc = 0 if there is no  for which the system
is vulnerable, and wc = 1 if there is no  for which the system is secure.
Threshold Relationship. The critical universal threshold of a system c is
related to the critical selective threshold 0c against the zero waveform w(t) =
0 through the equation 0c = 1 − c. Indeed, if a system is not universally -
secure, then P = Pr
[
Es(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
+1
2
) ]
> +12 , so
2−(1−)
2 =
+1
2 < P =
Pr
[
Es+0(t) ≥ Q+N−1
(
(1−(1−))+1
2
)]
, making the system selectively (1 − )-
secure for the zero waveform. Conversely, if a system is selectively (1− )-secure
for the zero waveform, then it is not universally -secure. The fact that a low
critical universal threshold results in a high critical selective threshold for the
zero threshold is not surprising: it is easy for an adversary to inject a zero signal
by simply not transmitting anything.
3.3 Universal Injection, Existential Security
The final notion of security is a weak one, which requires that the adversary
cannot inject at least one “representable” waveform into the system, i.e., one
which is within the ADC limits. We can express this more precisely as follows:
Definition 3 (Representable Waveform). A waveform w(t) is called rep-
resentable if it is within the ADC voltage levels, and has a maximum fre-
quency component bounded by the Nyquist frequency of the ADC. Mathemati-
cally, Vmin ≤ w(t) ≤ Vmax and fmax ≤ fs/2.
Using this, we can define security against at least one representable waveform:
Definition 4 (Existential Security, Universal Injection). For 0 ≤  < 1,
and V AdvPK ≥ 0, a system is called existentially (, V AdvPK )-secure if there exists
a representable waveform w(t) for which the system is selectively (, w(t), V AdvPK )-
secure. We call a system existentially -secure when V AdvPK is clear. If there is no
such w(t), we say that the adversary can perform any universal injection.
As above, voltage and probability are monotonic in the opposite direction.
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Table 2: The adversary can easily disturb the smartphone output (existential
injection), and inject human speech (universal injection). Selective injections of
sines are less precise than exponentials of the same frequency.
Injection Resulting Signal Crit. Thres.
Existential w(t) 6= 0 0.892
Selective w(t) = esin(2pifmt) 0.747
Selective w(t) = sin(2pifmt) 0.562
Universal “OK Google” commands ≤ 0.562
Voltage. If a system is existentially (, V1)-secure, then it is (, V2)-secure for
V2 ≤ V1. By assumption, there is a representable w(t) such that the system is se-
lectively (, w(t), V1)-secure. By the previous section, this system is (, w(t), V2)-
secure, concluding the proof.
Probability. If a system is existentially (1, V )-secure, then it is (2, V )-secure
for 1 ≤ 2. By assumption, there is a representable w(t) such that the system
is selectively (1, w(t), V )-secure. By the previous section, the system is also
(2, w(t), V )-secure, as desired.
Thresholds. Extending the definitions of the previous sections, for fixed  we
can define a critical existential voltage level V existc below which a system
is existentially -secure, and above which the system is existentially -insecure.
Similarly, for a fixed adversarial voltage we can define the critical existential
security threshold existc , above which the system is existentially secure, and
below which the system is insecure.
In some cases, security designers may wish to adjust the definitions to restrict
target waveforms (and existential security counterexamples) even further. For in-
stance, we might wish to check whether an adversary can inject all waveforms
which are sufficiently bounded away from 0, periodic waveforms, or waveforms
of a specific frequency. The proofs for voltage and probability monotonicity still
hold, allowing us to talk about universal security against S-representable wave-
forms: waveforms which are representable and also in a set S.
4 Security Evaluation of a Smartphone Microphone
In this section, we illustrate how our security definitions can be used to determine
the security level of a commercial, off-the-shelf smartphone microphone. We
first introduce an algorithm to calculate the critical selective security threshold
wc against a target waveform w(t) in Section 4.1. We then use the algorithm
to calculate the critical thresholds of a smartphone in Section 4.2. Finally, we
comment on universal security in Section 4.3, where we show that we are able to
inject complex “OK Google” commands. We summarize our results in Table 2,
while Appendix A contains additional experiments for further characterization
of the smartphone’s ADC.
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Algorithm 1 Determining the Critical Selective Security Threshold
1: procedure FindCriticalEpsilon(measured, ideal, sigma)
2: errors← |measured− ideal|/sigma . Calculate normalized absolute errors
3: lo← 0.5 . Probabilities need to be between 0.5 and 1
4: hi← 1
5: while lo < hi do
6: mid← (lo+ hi)/2 . mid represents (2− )/2
7: ninv ← ppf((1 +mid)/2) . Percentile point function
8: perror ← length([x ≥ ninv : x ∈ errors])/length(errors)
9: if |perror −mid|< δ & perror ≤ mid then . Threshold δ = 10−4
10: return 2− 2 ∗mid . Break out if sufficiently close
11: else if perror < mid then
12: hi← mid
13: else
14: lo← mid
15: procedure Compare(measurements, ideal) . Repeated measurements
16: ref ← detrend(measurements[0]) . Pick first as reference, remove DC
17: estimating ← align(scale(detrend(measurements[1 :]), ref), ref)
18: errors← (measured− ref) ∀measured ∈ estimating
19: σnoise ← std deviation(errors) . Calculate noise from estimations
20: ideal← align(scale(detrend(ideal), ref), ref)
21: return FindCriticalEpsilon(ref , ideal, σnoise)
4.1 Algorithm for Selective Security Thresholds
In this section, we introduce an algorithm to calculate the critical selective se-
curity threshold wc of a system against a target waveform w(t), using a trans-
mitted signal v(t). The first step in the algorithm (summarized in pseudocode
as Algorithm 1) is to determine the noise distribution. To that end, we collect
N measurements of the system output s˜f (t) during the injection and pick one
as the reference signal. We then pick 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 2 of them to calculate the
noise (estimation signals), while the remaining are used to verify our calculations
(validation signals).
Our algorithm first removes any DC offset and re-scales the measurements
so that the root-mean-square (RMS) voltages of the signals are the same. The
repeated measurements are then phase-aligned, and we calculate the distance
between the reference signal and the estimation signals. The average of this
distance should be very close to 0, as the signals are generated in the same
way. However, the standard deviation σ is non-zero, so we can model noise
as following a zero-mean normal distribution n(t) ∼ N(0, σ2). We can then find
the critical threshold between the reference signal and any target ideal waveform
w(t) as follows: we first detrend, scale, and align the ideal signal to the reference
waveform, as with the estimation signals. Then, we calculate the errors (distance)
between the ideal and the reference signal. Finally, we perform a binary search
for different values of , in order to find the largest  for which Equation (5) does
not hold: this is the critical threshold wc . To calculate the inverse of the noise, we
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Fig. 4: Clean (a) and Distorted (b) waveforms injected into the smartphone, with
ideal sine and exponential sine functions for comparison.
use the percentile point function ppf(), which is the inverse of the cumulative
distribution function, and satisfies N−1() = ppf((1 + )/2). Note that since the
critical universal threshold c is related to the selective critical threshold of the
zero waveform 0c through c = 1 − 0c (Section 3.2), the same algorithm can be
used to calculate the critical universal security threshold c.
4.2 Existential and Selective Injections into a Smartphone
We demonstrate how our algorithm can be used in a realistic setup using a
Motorola XT1541 Moto G3 smartphone. We inject amplitude-modulated fm =
1 kHz signals using a Rohde & Schwarz SMC100A/B103 generator into the head-
phone jack of the phone, following direct power injection (DPI) methodology [7].
We collect N = 10 measurements of 215 sample points per run using an “Au-
dio Recorder” app, and record the data at a frequency of fs = 44.1 kHz in a
[−1, 1] dimensionless range (AAC encoding). We first amplitude-modulate fm
over fc = 200 MHz using an output level of V
Adv
RMS = V
Adv
PK /
√
2 = 0.2 V. This
injection is demodulated well by the smartphone and has a “similarity” (see
Appendix A) of over 0.98 compared to a pure 1 kHz tone. We call this example
the “clean” waveform. The second injection, which we call the “distorted” wave-
form, uses fc = 25 MHz, V
Adv
RMS = 0.9 V, and has a similarity of less than 0.55 to
the ideal tone. Example measurements of these signals and “ideal” signals (see
below) are shown in Figure 4.
The algorithm first calculates the noise level using the reference signals. As
expected, the error average is very close to 0 (usually less than 10−6), while the
standard deviation σ is noticeable at around 0.0015. Taking the reference signals
as the target signal w(t), the critical selective thresholds are close to 1. In other
words, even if the injected waveforms do not correspond to “pure” signals, the
adversary can inject them with high fidelity: the system is not selectively secure
against them with high probability.
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Table 3: Mean and std. deviation (µ, σ) of critical selective thresholds wc for
different target signals w(t). Injections using the clean waveform are always more
successful than with the distorted waveform. Validation signals are injected with
high fidelity, and are better modeled by an exponential rather than a pure sine.
Waveform Validation Ideal Sine eIdeal Sine w(t) 6= 0
Clean (0.98, 0.03) (0.56, 0.04) (0.75, 0.06) (0.89, 0.01)
Distorted (0.95, 0.09) (0.31, 0.05) (0.34, 0.05) (0.71, 0.04)
We also tried two signals as the signal w(t) that the adversary is trying to
inject: a pure 1 kHz sine wave, and an exponential of the same sine wave. The
averages and standard deviations for the calculated thresholds over all combi-
nations of k and reference signals are shown in Table 3. As we would expect,
the thresholds for the distorted waveform are much lower than the values for
the clean waveform: the signal is distorted, so it is hard to inject an ideal signal.
We also find that the exponential function is a better fit for the signal we are
seeing, and can better explain the harmonics. Table 3 also includes the critical
universal injection threshold based on the two waveform injections. This thresh-
old is much higher for both waveforms, as injections disturb the ADC output
sufficiently, even when the demodulated signal is not ideal.
4.3 Universal Injections on a Smartphone
In this section, we demonstrate that the smartphone is vulnerable to the injec-
tion of arbitrary commands, which cause the smartphone to behave as if the user
initiated an action. Using the same setup of direct power injection (Section 4.2),
we first inject a modulated recording of “OK Google, turn on the flashlight” into
the microphone port, checking both whether the voice command service was acti-
vated in response to “OK Google”, and whether the desired action was executed.
We repeat measurements 10 times, each time amplitude-modulating the com-
mand at a depth of µ = 1.0 with V AdvRMS = 0.6 V on 26 carrier frequencies fc:
25 MHz, 50 MHz, and 100−2400 MHz at a step of 100 MHz. The voice-activation
feature (“OK Google”) worked with 100% success rate (10/10 repetitions) for all
frequencies, while the full command was successfully executed for 23 of the 26
frequencies we tested (all frequencies except fc ∈ {1.3, 2.0, 2.4GHz}). Increasing
the output level to V AdvRMS = 0.9 V, increased success rate to 25/26 frequencies.
Only fc = 2.4 GHz did not result in a full command injection, possibly because
the Wi-Fi disconnected in the process.
We repeated the above injections, testing 5 further commands to (1) call a
contact; (2) text a contact; (3) set a timer; (4) mute the volume; and (5) turn
on airplane mode. The results remained identical, regardless of the actual com-
mand to be executed. As a result, all carrier frequencies which are not severely
attenuated by HC (e.g., when coupling to the user’s headphones) are vulnerable
to injections of complex waveforms such as human speech.
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Table 4: The ADCs used in our experiments cover a range of different properties.
ADC Manufacturer Package Type Bits Max fs fcut
TLC549 Texas Instruments DIP SAR 8 40 kHz 2.7 MHz
ATmega328P Atmel Integrated SAR 10 76.9 kHz 0.1-11.4 MHz
Artix7 Xilinx Integrated SAR 12 1 MHz 5.3 MHz
AD7276 Analog Devices TSOT SAR 12 3 MHz 66.3 MHz
AD7783 Analog Devices TSSOP ∆Σ 24 19.79 Hz [50,60 Hz]
AD7822 Analog Devices DIP Flash 8 2 MHz 128.4 MHz
Fig. 5: Amplitude-modulated signals are directly injected into ADCs using a sig-
nal generator controlled over the VISA interface. Measurements are transferred
to a computer for analysis via a microcontroller’s UART interface.
5 Commercial ADC Response HA to Malicious Signals
As explained in Section 2, an adversary trying to inject signals remotely into a
system typically needs to transmit modulated signals over high-frequency carri-
ers. As HC is unique to each circuit and needs to be re-calculated even for minor
changes to its components and layout [6], the first step to determine the system
vulnerability is to understand the behavior HA of the ADC used.
To do so, we inject signals into the ADCs to determine their demodula-
tion characteristics. As shown in Figure 5, the output of the Rohde & Schwarz
signal generator is directly connected to the ADC under test, while additional
experiments with an amplifier or with remote transmissions are performed in Ap-
pendix A. An Arduino Uno (ATmega328P microcontroller) interfaces with the
ADC over the appropriate protocol, while a computer collects the measurements
from the microcontroller over the UART, and controls the signal generator over
the VISA interface.
Experiments are conducted with six ADCs from four manufacturers (Texas
Instruments, Analog Devices, Atmel, and Xilinx) in different packages: some are
part of the silicon in other ICs, while others are standalone surface-mount or
through-hole chips. Delta-Sigma (∆Σ), half-flash, and successive approximation
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Fig. 6: Example ATmega328P output for power P = 0 dBm, signal frequency
fm = 1 Hz, and modulation depth µ = 0.5. The signal exhibits the correct
fundamental frequency, but also contains strong harmonics and a high-frequency
component, which is attenuated as the carrier frequency fc increases.
(SAR) ADCs are tested, with sampling rates fs ranging from a few Hz to several
MHz, and resolutions between 8 and 24 bits. Table 4 shows these properties along
with the −3 dB cutoff frequency fcut, calculated using the R,C parameters in
the ADCs’ datasheets.
We use sinusoidals of frequencies fm that have been amplitude-modulated
on carrier frequencies fc. In other words, we consider the intended signal to be
w(t) = sin(2pifmt), the sensor signal to be absent (s(t) = 0), and evaluate how
“close” w(t) is to the ADC output s˜f (t). We summarize typical results for each
ADC here, and present more details in Appendix A.
ATmega328P. Figure 6 presents two example measurements of outputs of the
ATmega328P, both in the time domain and in the frequency domain. The input
to the ADC is a fm = 1 Hz signal modulated over different high-frequency car-
riers. As shown in the frequency domain (bottom of Figure 6), the fundamental
frequency fm dominates all other frequencies, so the attacker is able to inject a
signal of the intended frequency into the output of the ADC. However, the out-
put at both carrier frequencies has strong harmonics at 2fm, 3fm, . . .Hz, which
indicates that the resulting signal is not pure. Moreover, there is a residual high-
frequency component, which is attenuated as the carrier frequency fc increases.
Finally, there is a frequency-dependent DC offset caused, in part, by the ESD
diodes, while the peak-to-peak amplitude of the measured signal decreases as
the carrier frequency increases. This is due to the low-pass filtering behavior of
the sample-and-hold mechanism, which also explains why we are only able to
demodulate signals for carrier frequencies until approximately 150 MHz.
TLC549. The TLC549 (Figure 7a) also demodulates the injected signal, but
still contains harmonics and a small high-frequency component.
AD7783. As the AD7783 (Figure 7b) only has a sampling frequency of fs =
19.79 Hz, aliasing occurs when the baseband signal exceeds the Nyquist frequency
18 Ilias Giechaskiel, Youqian Zhang, and Kasper B. Rasmussen
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.283 0.284
2
2.2
100 101 102 103 104
-150
-100
-50
0
(a) TLC549: fc = 80 MHz, µ = 0.5,
fm = 1 Hz
0 5 10 15
1.15
1.2
1.25
3 3.5 4
1.14
1.15
10-1 100
-100
-50
0
(b) AD7783: fc = 40 MHz, µ = 1.0,
fm = 10 Hz
Fig. 7: Example TLC549 (a) and AD7783 (b) outputs for a transmission power of
P = 5 dBm. Both ADCs demodulate the injected signal, but present harmonics
and some high-frequency components. The AD7783 signal is aliased.
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Fig. 8: Example AD7822 output for power P = −5 dBm, signal frequency fm =
5 Hz, and depth µ = 0.5. Signal demodulation requires a fine-tuned fc.
fs/2. For example, when the baseband frequency is fm = 10 Hz, the fundamental
frequency dominating the measurements is of frequency 2fm−fs = 20−19.79 =
0.21 Hz, with a high-frequency component of fs − fm = 9.79 Hz.
AD7822, AD7276, Artix7. The three remaining ADCs contain strong high-
frequency components which dominate the low-frequency signal. Their outputs
appear to be AM-modulated, but at a carrier frequency which is below the
ADC’s Nyquist frequency. However, with manual tuning of the carrier frequency,
it is possible to remove this high frequency component, causing the ADC to
demodulate the input. This is shown for the Flash ADC AD7822 in Figure 8,
where we change the carrier frequency fc in steps of 100 Hz.
Conclusion. The results of our experiments lead to the following observations:
1. Generality – All 6 ADCs tested are vulnerable to signal injections at multi-
ple carrier frequencies, as they demodulate signals, matching the theoretical
expectations of Section 2.1. As the ADCs are of all major types and with
a range of different resolutions and sampling frequencies, the conclusions
drawn should also be valid for other ADC chips.
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2. Low-Pass Filter – Although all ADCs exhibited low-pass filtering charac-
teristics, the maximum vulnerable carrier frequency for a given power level
was multiple times the cut-off frequency of the RC circuit at the input of
the ADC. This extended the frequency range that an attacker could use for
transmissions to attack the system.
3. Power – The adversary needs to select the power level of transmissions
carefully: too much power in the input of the ADC can cause saturation
and/or clipping of the measured signal. Too little power, on the other hand,
results in output that looks like noise or a zero signal.
4. Carrier Frequency – Some ADCs were vulnerable at any carrier frequency
that is not severely attenuated by the sample-and-hold mechanism. For oth-
ers, high-frequency components dominated the intended baseband signal of
frequency fm in the ADC output for most frequencies. Even then, carefully-
chosen carrier frequencies resulted in a demodulated ADC output.
6 Discussion
We now discuss how our work can inform design choices. To start, choosing
the right ADC directly impacts the susceptibility to signal injection attacks. As
shown in Section 5, some ADCs distort the demodulated output and result in
more sawtooth-like output, making them more resilient to clean sinusoidal in-
jections. Moreover, other ADCs require fine-grained control over the carrier fre-
quency of injection. As the adversarial signal is transformed through the circuit-
specific transfer function HC , the adversary may not have such control, resulting
in a more secure system.
Having chosen the appropriate ADC based on cost, performance, security, or
other considerations, a designer needs to assess the impact of HC . Prior work
has shown that even small layout or component changes affect the EMI behavior
of a circuit [6,13,23]. Since the ADC behavior can be independently determined
through direct power injections, fewer experiments with remote transmissions are
required to evaluate the full circuit behavior and how changes in the circuit’s
topology influence the system’s security.
Our selective security definition and algorithm address how to determine the
vulnerability of a system against specific waveforms. Universal security, on the
other hand, allows us to directly compare the security of two systems for a fixed
adversarial voltage budget through their critical universal security thresholds.
Moreover, given a probability/threshold , we can calculate the critical universal
voltage level, which is the maximum output level for which a system is still
universally -secure.
Our smartphone case study showed that our framework can be used in prac-
tice with real systems, while our “OK Google” experiments demonstrated that
less-than-perfect injections of adversarial waveforms can have the same effect as
perfect injections. This is because there is a mismatch between the true noise
level of a system and the worst-case noise level that the system expects. In other
words, injections worked at all carrier frequencies, even when the demodulated
output was noisy or distorted. This is a deliberate, permissive design decision,
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which allows the adversary to succeed with a range of different and noisy wave-
forms w(t), despite small amplitudes and DC offsets.
Although not heavily discussed in this paper, our model and definitions are
general enough to capture alternative signal injection techniques. For instance,
electro-mechanical sensors have resonant frequencies which allow acoustic in-
jection attacks [22,25]. HC can account for such imperfections in the sensors
themselves, attenuating injection frequencies which are not close to the resonant
frequencies. Our system model also makes it easy to evaluate countermeasures
and defense mechanisms in its context. For example, shielding increases the
attenuation factor of HC , thereby increasing the power requirements for the
adversary (Section 2.1). Alternatively, a low-pass filter (LPF) before the ADC
and/or amplifier changes HA, and attenuates the high-frequency components
which would induce non-linearities. Note, however, that even moving the pre-
amplifier, LPF and ADC into the same IC package does not fully eliminate the
vulnerability to signal injection attacks (Section 7) as the channel between the
analog sensor and the ADC cannot be fundamentally authenticated.
7 Related Work
Ever since a 2013 paper by Kune et al. showed that electromagnetic (EM) sig-
nals can be used to cause medical devices to deliver defibrillation shocks [10],
there has been a rise in EM, acoustic, and optical signal injection attacks against
sensor and actuator systems [7]. Although some papers have focused on vulner-
abilities caused by the ADC sampling process itself [2], others have focused on
exploiting the control algorithms that make use of the digitized signal. For exam-
ple, Shoukry et al. showed how to force the Anti-Lock Braking Systems (ABS)
to model the real input signal as a disturbance [20]. Selvaraj et al. also used the
magnetic field to perform attacks on actuators, but further explored the rela-
tionship between frequency and the average injected voltage into ADCs [19]. By
contrast, our paper primarily focused on a formal mathematical framework to
understand security in the context of signal injection attacks, but also investi-
gated the demodulation properties of different ADCs.
Our work further highlighted how to use the introduced algorithm and defi-
nitions to investigate the security of a smartphone, complementing earlier work
which had shown that AM-modulated electromagnetic transmissions can be
picked up by hands-free headsets to trigger voice commands in smartphones [9].
Voice injection attacks can also be achieved by modulating signals on ultrasound
frequencies [27], or by playing two tones at different ultrasound frequencies and
exploiting non-linearities in components [18]. Acoustic transmissions at a device’s
resonant frequencies can also incapacitate [22] or precisely control [24] drones,
with attackers who account for sampling rate drifts being able to control the
outputs of accelerometers for longer periods of time [25]. Moreover, optical at-
tacks can be used to spoof medical infusion pump measurements [14], and cause
autonomous cars and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to drift or fail [3,16,26].
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It should be noted that although the literature has primarily focused on
signal injection attacks, some works have also proposed countermeasures. These
defense mechanisms revolve around better sampling techniques, for example by
adding unspoofable physical and computational delays [21], or by oversampling
and selectively turning the sensors off using a secret sequence [28].
Overall, despite the extensive literature on signal injection attacks and de-
fenses, the setup and effectiveness of different works is often reported in an in-
consistent way, making their results hard to compare [7]. Our work, recognizing
this gap, introduced a formal foundation to define and quantify security against
signal injection attacks, working towards unifying the reporting methodology for
competing works.
8 Conclusion
Sensors guide many of our choices, and we often blindly trust their values. How-
ever, it is possible to spoof their outputs through electromagnetic or other signal
injection attacks. To address the lack of a unifying framework describing the sus-
ceptibility of devices to such attacks, we defined a system and adversary model
for signal injections. Our model is the first to abstract away from specific envi-
ronments and circuit designs and presents a strong adversary who is only limited
by transmission power. It also makes it easy to discuss and evaluate countermea-
sures in its context and covers different types of signal injection attacks.
Within our model, we defined existential, selective, and universal security,
capturing effects ranging from mere disruptions of the ADC outputs to precise
injections of all waveforms. We showed that our definitions can be used to evalu-
ate the security level of an off-the-shelf smartphone, and introduced an algorithm
to calculate “critical” thresholds, which express how close an injected signal is
to the ideal signal. Finally, we characterized the demodulation characteristics
of commercial ADCs to malicious injections. In response to the emerging signal
injection threat, our work paves the way towards a future where security can be
quantified and compared through our methodology and security definitions.
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A Additional Experiments with ADCs
This appendix contains further measurements on the demodulation properties
of ADCs. Section A.1 precisely defines the similarity metric of Section 4, and
validates the experimental setup. Section A.2 and A.3 then conduct further char-
acterization experiments of the smartphone microphone and ATmega328P ADC
respectively. Finally, Section A.4 contains additional examples of the demodula-
tion characteristics of the remaining ADCs.
A.1 Similarity Metric and Setup Validation
The experiments of Section 4.2 required an independent metric to evaluate how
“similar” two signals are as a way of independently validating the security defi-
nitions of Section 3. The metric proposed for this task is based on the Pearson
Correlation Coefficient (PCC), which is commonly found in signal-alignment and
optimization applications [1,11]. It is defined as the covariance of two variables
divided by the product of their standard deviations:
ρ (X,Y ) =
cov (X,Y )
σXσY
=
∑n
i=1 (xi − µx) (yi − µy)√∑n
i=1 (xi − µx)2
√∑n
i=1 (yi − µy)2
(6)
It is a suitable metric because it removes the mean value of the signals (DC
shift), as well as the effects of scaling (related to transmission power). In other
words, ρ (X, aX + b) = 1 for a variable X and scalars a, b. However, the PCC
is sensitive to signal alignment. To overcome this issue, the phase (time) offset
between two signals sa, sb can be found using cross-correlation. Specifically, the
signals are aligned when the cross-correlation coefficient is maximized:
lag (sa, sb) = arg max
n
((sa ? sb) (n)) (7)
Using Equations (6) and (7), the similarity metric between the measured signal
s˜f (t) and the ideal signal w(t) can be defined as follows:
similarity (s˜f , w) = ρ
(
s˜f , w
lag
)
(8)
24 Ilias Giechaskiel, Youqian Zhang, and Kasper B. Rasmussen
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
-0.5
0
0.5
101 102 103 104
-150
-100
-50
0
(a) fm (Ideal & Microphone)
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01 0.012
-0.01
0
0.01
0.02
1.2 1.4 1.6
10-3
-0.02
0
0.02
102 103 104
-150
-100
-50
0
(b) fm × fc (Oscilloscope)
0 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.01
-2
0
2
4
6
10-3
1 1.2 1.4 1.6
10-3
-2
0
2
10-3
100 102 104
-200
-150
-100
-50
(c) fm × fc (Microphone)
Fig. 9: Unmodulated and modulated injections measured by an oscilloscope and
a smartphone microphone, with RMS voltage V AdvRMS = 20 mV, signal frequency
fm = 1 kHz, carrier frequency fc = 10 kHz, and modulation depth µ = 1.0.
To sanity-check this metric and the experimental setup, an unmodulated 20 mV
fm = 1 kHz signal is generated. Figure 9a shows this waveform as measured by
the smartphone of Section 4.2 along with an ideal 1 kHz signal. Even though the
amplitudes are different, the frequency responses of the measured and the ideal
signal are almost identical, with the two signals having a similarity of 0.9991
according to Equation (8).
Figures 9b and 9c additionally show the same fm = 1 kHz signal modulated
on a carrier frequency of fc = 10 kHz at a depth of µ = 1.0. This carrier frequency
was chosen as it is within the Nyquist range of the smartphone ADC (sampling
frequency fs = 44.1 kHz). Figure 9b contains measurements taken by a Rigol
DS2302A oscilloscope with a timescale division of 500 µs, while Figure 9c uses
the smartphone microphone.
Unlike the examples of Section 4, the measurements shown in Figure 9 do
not exhibit harmonics, but rather high-frequency components at fc and fc±fm,
as expected. Consequently, the demodulation characteristics are due to non-
linearities in amplifiers and ADCs when used outside of their intended range,
instead of the experimental setup.
A.2 Smartphone Microphone Properties
This section characterizes the smartphone microphone through the direct injec-
tion methodology of Section 5. An fm = 1 kHz tone is amplitude-modulated with
a depth of µ = 1.0 on the following carrier frequencies fc: 25 MHz, 50 MHz, and
0.1 − 2.4 GHz at a step of 100 MHz. The RMS output level V AdvRMS = V AdvPK /
√
2
of the signal generator is also varied between 0.2− 0.9 V at a step of 100 mV.
The similarity of the measured to the ideal signal for various carrier frequen-
cies fc and output levels V
Adv
RMS is shown in Figure 10a. It is consistently high
for all frequencies when 0.2 V ≤ V AdvRMS ≤ 0.6 V, while higher voltage levels lead
to more pronounced harmonics and clipping, reducing the similarity. The results
are consistent across measurements: the 99% confidence interval of the similarity
is always below ±0.0005, except for the (fc, V AdvRMS) pairs (300 MHz, 0.5 V) and
(2.4 GHz, 0.9 V), where it reaches 0.035.
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(a) Similarity to the ideal signal (b) VRMS for different µ
(c) VRMS for different V
Adv
RMS (d) VRMS relative to V
Adv
RMS = 0.2 V
Fig. 10: Results of amplitude-modulated fm = 1 kHz injections into the smart-
phone microphone for different carrier frequencies fc, depths µ, and output volt-
age levels V AdvRMS . (a) shows the similarity of the measured output compared to
the ideal signal. (b) and (c) illustrate the received RMS voltages VRMS for dif-
ferent modulation depths µ and V AdvRMS respectively. Finally, (d) shows VRMS
relative to V AdvRMS = 0.2 V.
According to work on amplifier properties [23], the measured RMS voltage
level VRMS , the input voltage V
Adv
RMS , the modulation depth µ, the signal fre-
quency fm, and the carrier frequency fc satisfy the following relationship:
VRMS =
√
2
2
µ
(
V AdvRMS
)2 |H2 (fc,− (fc − fm))| (9)
where H2 is a second-order transfer function. Figure 10 mostly confirms this
equation for the microphone and ADC subsystem of the smartphone.
Specifically, fixing µ and fm in Equation (9) suggests that V
V1
RMS/V
V2
RMS =
(V1/V2)
2 across all carrier frequencies fc. Indeed, Figure 10b verifies that the
received RMS voltage VRMS is linear in the modulation depth µ for fixed V
Adv
RMS ∈
{0.4, 0.6}V with R2 > 0.97. For 0.2 V, the relationship becomes linear after
µ ≈ 0.8, as the measured VRMS is approximately 0 below that.
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(c) V AdvRMS = 0.9 V, fc = 1.5 GHz
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(d) V AdvRMS = 0.9 V, fc = 2.0 GHz
Fig. 11: Microphone output for fm = 1 kHz and µ = 1.0.
Figure 10c illustrates that the transfer function for the VRMS response is
frequency-dependent. Finally, Figure 10d shows VRMS relative to V
Adv
RMS = 0.2 V.
For 0.3 V ≤ VRMS ≤ 0.6 V and fc ≥ 100 MHz, there is a linear relationship
between the carrier frequency and VRMS/V
0.2V
RMS , as predicted by Equation (9).
Figure 11 shows example microphone outputs for different carrier frequencies
fc and output voltages V
Adv
RMS . They all exhibit high harmonics, but the similarity
compared to the ideal signal for Figures 11a–11c is still over 0.9. However, the
injection of Figure 11d contains more pronounced distortions, and the similarity
drops to less than 0.3.
Overall, the results of this section show that a higher-order transfer function
may be needed to more accurately predict the ADC output, both in terms of its
RMS voltage, and in terms of the harmonics it produces.
A.3 ATmega328P Characterization
This section contains detailed results for injections into the ATmega328P ADC
in three different arrangements: (a) the ADC on its own; (b) the ADC with an
amplifier; and (c) the ADC with an amplifier and an antenna. The experimental
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(a) ADC only
(b) ADC + Amplifier (c) ADC + Amplifier + Antenna
Fig. 12: Similarity metrics for injections into the ATmega328P for different trans-
mission powers P , modulation depths µ, and carrier frequencies fc. The amplifier
increases the vulnerable frequencies to the GHz range, allowing remote attacks.
results support the theoretical model of Section 2 and show that, despite its
low-pass filtering behavior, the ADC demodulates signals carried at frequencies
multiple times the cut-off frequency of the sample-and-hold mechanism. More-
over, external amplifier non-linearities increase the vulnerable frequency band
into the GHz range.
ATmega328P Only. The first experiment targets the ATmega328P directly,
without using any additional components. The similarity of the demodulated
signal to the ideal signal is calculated for injections at different powers P , mod-
ulation depths µ, carrier frequencies fc, and a signal frequency of fm = 1 Hz. As
Figure 12a illustrates, the similarity for fc = 1 MHz is always low due to aliasing.
However, similarity is high for fc between 10−150 MHz, but signals are severely
attenuated for fc ≥ 300 MHz. Small modulation depths and powers do not result
in demodulated outputs, while too much power causes the ADC to be saturated.
This leads to partial clipping of the signal, or induces a DC offset which is be-
yond the range of the ADC. Overall, the adversary has a range of choices for
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P and µ, and can use carrier frequencies which are multiple times the cutoff
frequency of the ADC, provided these are not attenuated by the circuit-specific
transfer function HC .
ATmega328P + Amplifier. A low-cost, off-the-shelf wideband LNA is added
before the input to the ADC to change the transfer function HA. The amplifier
works between 1−2000 MHz and can perform a maximum amplification of 32 dB.
It can output at most 10 dBm, and has a noise figure of approximately 2 dB.
Sinusoidals of fm = 1 Hz and fm = 10 Hz are modulated at depths of µ ∈
{0.5, 1.0} on carrier frequencies fc from 100 MHz to 2.4 GHz at transmission
powers P between −20 dBm and 10 dBm. As can be seen in Figure 12b, the
similarity is high across all frequencies, provided the transmission power is above
a minimum threshold.
The amplifier thus both reduces the power requirements for the adversary,
and increases the vulnerable frequencies to the GHz range. This allows an at-
tacker to target systems with short wires between the ADC and the sensor with
a lower power budget: short wires are not a sufficient defense against electromag-
netic out-of-band signal injection attacks. Moreover, it should be noted that an
adversary gains an advantage by not obeying the amplifier constraints: abusing
the amplifier by transmitting higher-powered signals or by driving frequency sig-
nals outside of the intended range still results in recognizable output. In other
words, although the signal may be distorted, non-linearities produce outputs
within the range of the ADC.
ATmega328P + Amplifier + Antenna. The final set of experiments changes
the circuit-specific transfer function HC by using a transmitting antenna at the
signal generator output and a receiving antenna at the amplifier input. The
antennas used are Ettus Research omnidirectional VERT400 antennas, which
are resonant at 144 MHz, 400 MHz, and 1.2 GHz. The antennas are placed in
parallel at a distance of 5 cm to one another, and the results for sine signals of
fm = 1 Hz and fm = 10 Hz are presented in Figure 12c. Although the minimum
power required for successful injections is higher due to transmission losses, the
system remains vulnerable for all three frequencies due to the amplifier and
ADC non-linearities. In other words, results are reproducible across multiple
setups, whether through remote transmissions, or through direct injections with
an identity transfer function HC(σ + jω) = L{v˜(t)}/L{v(t)} = 1.
Figures 13–15 show example outputs from the internal ATmega328P ADC
for different carrier frequencies fc, powers P , and modulation depths µ, with
fm fixed at 1 Hz. Figure 13 first shows the results for the ADC on its own,
and complements Figure 6 of Section 5. Although harmonics of the fundamental
persist, the high-frequency component becomes less pronounced as fc increases.
Figure 14 then shows output from the ATmega328P for two different carrier
frequencies fc when connected to an amplifier. The ADC no longer behaves
like a low-pass filter due to non-linearities, while harmonics of the fundamental
remain strong. Finally, Figure 15 shows output from the ATmega328P for remote
injections using the VERT400 antenna with the amplifier. As in the amplifier
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Fig. 13: ATmega328P-only output for power P = 0 dBm, signal frequency fm =
1 Hz, and modulation depth µ = 0.5.
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(b) fc = 2.4 GHz
Fig. 14: ATmega328P with amplifier output for power P = −5 dBm, signal fre-
quency fm = 1 Hz, and modulation depth µ = 1.0.
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(c) fc = 1.2 GHz
Fig. 15: ATmega328P with amplifier and antenna output for power P = 0 dBm,
signal frequency fm = 1 Hz, and modulation depth µ = 0.5.
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(b) fc = 120 MHz
Fig. 16: TLC549 output for power P = 5 dBm, signal frequency fm = 1 Hz, and
depth µ = 0.5.
case, carrier frequencies in the GHz range are still demodulated, and harmonics
(and some high-frequency components) persist.
A.4 Further ADC Demodulation Examples
This section contains additional examples of injections into the different ADCs.
TLC549. Figure 16 shows example outputs from the TLC549 ADC for two
carrier frequencies fc. Harmonics of the fundamental are not pronounced, as the
resolution is only 8 bits.
Artix 7. Figure 17 shows example outputs from the Artix 7 ADC for two carrier
frequencies fc. The output contains high-frequency components which dominate
the target signal, forcing injections to require more fine-grained control over the
carrier frequency.
AD7783. Figure 18 shows the output from the (slow) ∆Σ AD7783 ADC for
different carrier frequencies and modulation depths. As fm = 10 Hz is above the
Nyquist frequency, aliasing occurs. The strongest frequency present is 2fm−fs =
0.21 Hz, while the high-frequency component is fs − fm = 9.79 Hz.
AD7822 & AD7276. Figure 19a and Figure 19b show example measurements
for the AD7822 and the AD7276 ADCs respectively. As for the Artix 7, high-
frequency components dominate the output, and hence require manual tuning
to get a demodulated, low-frequency output.
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Fig. 17: Artix 7 output for power P = 10 dBm, signal frequency fm = 1 Hz, and
depth µ = 0.5.
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Fig. 18: AD7783 output for power P = 5 dBm and signal frequency fm = 10 Hz.
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(a) AD7822: fc = 10 MHz
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(b) AD7276: fc = 40 MHz
Fig. 19: AD7822 (a) and AD7276 (b) output for P = −1 dBm, µ = 0.5, and
fm = 10 Hz.
